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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FINDING THE NEEDLE-TOWARD A
MORE STRINGENT STANDARD FOR EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL
Rompilla v. Beard, 125 S. Ct. 2456 (2005)
Brooke R. Hardy*
Petitioner was convicted by a jury of, among other offenses,' brutally
murdering a local barkeeper. 2 At the sentencing phase of the bifurcated
proceeding, Petitioner's counsel presented the brief testimony of only five
mitigation witnesses. 3 Balancing the evidence, the jury found three
aggravating factors4 and two mitigating factors,5 concluded that the
aggravators outweighed the mitigators,6 and sentenced Petitioner to death.7
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed both Petitioner's
conviction and his sentence.8
With the aid of new counsel, Petitioner filed for post-conviction relief
under a Pennsylvania statute, 9 claiming, inter alia, ineffective assistance
of trial counsel."° The post-conviction court denied relief, finding that the
trial counsel's investigation into possible mitigating factors was

* Thanks to Pamela Hardy, who is the real writer in my family, and to Terra DuBois, who
could not possibly mean more to me.
1. In addition to first-degree, capital murder, Petitioner was convicted of "burglary, criminal
trespass, robbery, two counts of theft, and two counts of receiving stolen property." Commonwealth
v. Rompilla, 653 A.2d 626, 628 (Pa. 1995).
2. Rompilla v. Beard, 125 S. Ct. 2456, 2460 (2005). In his dissent, Justice Kennedy
emphasized the brutal nature of the crime, stating that the victim had been found "lying in a pool
of blood" with a number of stab wounds around his head and neck. Id. at 2471-72 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
3. Id. at 2460-61 (majority opinion).
4. The jury found, specifically, "that the murder was committed in the course of another
felony; that the murder was committed by torture; and that [there was] a significant history of
felony convictions indicating. .. violence." Id. (citing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711 (d)(6), (8), (9)
(2002)).
5. Although trial counsel put on a mitigation case including the testimony of five family
members that Petitioner was "innocent and a good man," the jury accepted only two mitigating
factors as true: "that [Petitioner]'s son had testified on his behalf and that rehabilitation was
possible." Id.
6. ld. at 2461.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. (citing Pennsylvania Post-Conviction ReliefAct, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9541 (2004)).
10. Id. Petitioner based this claim on trial counsel's alleged failure to introduce certain other
"significant" mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase, including information about
Petitioner's "childhood, mental capacity and health, and alcoholism." Id.
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2 supreme court agreed and affirm.
e d the denial of postauequate. 1 lie state
relief.1
conviction
Having exhausted his state remedies, Petitioner applied for a writ of
habeas corpus' 3 in federal district court, renewing his claim of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel.14 The District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania granted Petitioner's request for relief, holding that the state
post-conviction court had "unreasonably applied"15 the framework that the
16
United States Supreme Court had developed in Stricklandv. Washington
during the penalty portion of Petitioner's criminal trial.' 7 On appeal, a split
Third Circuit reversed; the majority held that the state post-conviction
court's application of the Strickland standard was not unreasonable 18 and
that Petitioner's case was distinguishable from Wiggins v. Smith,' 9 the
Court's then-most-recent case regarding ineffective assistance of counsel.20

11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Rompilla's petition for federal habeas relief relied on 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000), which
states in relevant part:
The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall
entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only... [if] he is in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws ...of the United States ....
Because the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to assistance of counsel, see infra note 24 and
accompanying text, Rompilla's ineffective assistance claim properly alleged the constitutional
violation a habeas petition requires. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2000).
14. Rompilla, 125 S.Ct. at 2461.
15. Id.
16. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
17. Rompilla, 125 S.Ct. at 2461. The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
based its grant of habeas relief on Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, finding
specifically that trial counsel "unjustifiably" placed excessive weight on conversations with
Petitioner regarding his background, thus failing to properly pursue "pretty obvious" outlying
mitigating factors. Id. For examples of these mitigators, see supra note 10.
18. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104132, § 104 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2) (2000)), added a new hurdle for defendants to
overcome, in addition to the Strickland standard, to obtain post-conviction relief. The AEDPA
modified the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000), such that a defendant had to
show, post-AEDPA, that the state court decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law," or "was based on an unreasonabledetermination
of the facts." See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2) (emphasis added).
19. 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
20. Rompilla, 125 S.Ct. at 2461. The Third Circuit majority viewed the actions of
Petitioner's trial counsel as factually different from Wiggins' trial counsel. Id. While Petitioner's
counsel was reasonable, considering the amount of investigation already completed, in the belief
that further investigation would not be helpful when balanced against minimal available resources,
Wiggins' counsel performed only cursory searches, and "ignor[ed] the leads" that resulted. Id. This, 2
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss2/6
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The Third Circuit denied Petitioner's request for a rehearing en banc 2' and
Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court granted certiorari
and, reversing the decision of the Third Circuit,22 HELD, that when the
prosecution is likely to utilize specific aggravating evidence during capital
sentencing, the Sixth Amendment requires a reasonable attempt by defense
counsel to procure and examine that evidence, despite intimations by the
defendant that investigation into a mitigation case will be fruitless.
The Sixth Amendment guards the rights of the accused, and it
specifically guarantees a criminal defendant the "Assistance of Counsel."'24
Within the body of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has
continually refined what constitutes assistance 25 in light of its importance
according to the Third Circuit majority, justified the finding that Wiggins' counsel "failed to
investigate adequately." Id.
The Third Circuit dissent argued that trial counsel's behavior, including undue reliance on
mitigation testimony and failure to obtain certain pertinent records, was unreasonable. Id.; see also
dissenting) (describing the unobtained
Rompilla v. Horn, 355 F.3d 233, 273 (2004) (Sloviter, J.,
evidence as "school, medical, court and prison records").
21. Rompilla, 125 S. Ct. at 2461.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 2460.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment states:

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted
with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
Id.
25. Originally, the Court interpreted the language of the Sixth Amendment to mean that a
criminal defendant's constitutional right was violated only if there was a complete denial of
counsel. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (stating that "any person haled
into court... cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him"); Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458,463 (1938) (extending the right of appointed counsel to indigent federal defendants);
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (holding that the right to counsel in capital cases is a
fundamental right, and the denial of that right to state defendants is a "denial of due process within
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment"). This interpretation has gradually progressed to
include not only actual, complete denial of counsel, but also constructive denial of counsel,
governmental interference with the independence of counsel, and eventually, ineffective assistance
of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 683 (1984) ("The Court has considered
Sixth Amendment claims based on actual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel
altogether, as well as claims based on state interference with the ability of counsel to render
effective assistance to the accused."); Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985) ("[A] party whose
counsel is unable to provide effective representation is in no better position than one who has no
counsel at all."); Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336,349 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding constructive denial
of counsel when the attorney repeatedly slept during trial: "Unconscious counsel equates to no
counsel at all."). This list of possible Sixth Amendment violations based on the right to counsel is
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in "protect[ing] the fundamental right to a fair Lrial. ' 26 Indeed, even after
interpretation of Sixth Amendment language had broadened to include
occasions where counsel was merely ineffective rather than absent, 27 lower
courts applied a number of different standards to decide when counsel's
performance crossed into constitutional deficiency.28
In Strickland v. Washington,29 the Court finally established the proper
standard for measuring defense counsel's performance against the
requirements of the Sixth Amendment.3" Articulating a framework within
which future ineffective assistance of counsel claims could be analyzed,
the Court required a two-part showing." First, a defendant bore the burden
of demonstrating that "counsel's performance was deficient."3 2 Second,
even after establishing counsel's inadequacy, a defendant had to
demonstrate that the "deficient performance prejudiced the defense."33
Without proving both prongs, the Court concluded, a defendant could not
complain that "the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown
in the adversary process that render[ed] the result unreliable. ' 34
Having sketched a sturdy skeleton, the Strickland Court clarified its
newly adopted framework by establishing standards by which each prong

neither exhaustive nor inclusive.
26. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684.
27. See id. at 686 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970))
(explaining "the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel").
28. The major disagreement among the lower courts before Stricklandinvolved the suitability
of establishing rigid guidelines against which to measure counsel's performance when deciding
ineffective assistance claims. See WAYNE R. LAFAvE, JERALD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, 3
CRIMINALPRoCEDuRE§ 11.10(a) (2ded. 1999). Two major lines of cases emerged--those favoring
the categorical approach, in which courts would apply a checklist of minimums that counsel must
fulfill to be considered competent, and those favoring the judgmental approach, in which courts
would look to the totality of the particular circumstances in evaluating counsel performance. See
YALE KAMISAR ET AL, ADVANCED CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES, COMMENTS, AND QUESTIONS
157 (11 th ed. 2005). For cases that advocated a categorical standard, see United States v. Decoster,
624 F.2d 196, 275 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Bazelon, J., dissenting), and Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224,
226 (4th Cir. 1968). For cases that supported a judgmental standard, see Baldwin v. Maggio, 704
F.2d 1325, 1329 (5th Cir. 1983); Decoster,624 F.2d at 203 (plurality opinion of Leventhal, J.); and
Commonwealth v. Saferian, 315 N.E.2d 878, 883 (Mass. 1974).
29. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
30. Id. at 687.
31. Id.
32. Id. The Court elaborated on the first prong of the new framework, defining deficiency as

"errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed ... by the Sixth
Amendment," id., and requiring a showing that "counsel's representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688.
33. Id. at 687. Again, the Court expanded upon the framework, describing prejudice as
serious error that "deprive[d] the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Id.
34. Id.
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would be measured. 35 Deficient performance, according to the Court,
should be a totality of the circumstances analysis, weighing whether
counsel provided "reasonably effective assistance" as judged by
"prevailing professional norms. 36 Similarly, prejudice should be measured
by the "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
37
errors," the proceeding would have culminated in a different result.
Nearly twenty years later, in Williams v. Taylor,38 the Court applied this
framework in conjunction with a recently enacted statutory amendment
that modified the amount of deference courts owed to findings of state
post-conviction courts during habeas review.39 In Williams, a divided
Court clarified for the first time the additional burden that the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) 4
imposed on a defendant seeking federal post-conviction relief due to
ineffective assistance of counsel.4 Justice O'Connor, writing for the
majority regarding AEDPA,42 held that before attempting to satisfy the
Strickland test, a defendant had to show either that the state court applied
a rule contradictory to established Supreme Court precedent, or that the
state court applied the correct rule in an "objectively unreasonable"
manner.43 Justice Stevens,' writing for a different majority regarding the

35. See id. at 687-88, 694.
36. Id. at 687-88; see also LAFAVE, ISRAEL& KING, supra note 28, § 11.10(a). Although
many lower courts advocated a more categorical approach, extolling the virtues of rigid guidelines
and "checklist[s] for judicial evaluation," the Court expressly rejected this standard, stating: "More
specific guidelines are not appropriate." Strickland,466 U.S. at 688. Justice Marshall, in his dissent,
disagreed with the Strickland Court's more judgmental, case-by-case analysis. See id. at 706-19
(Marshall, J.,
dissenting). For a better understanding of the categorical approach, see cases cited
supra note 28.
37. Strickland,466 U.S. at 694 (majority opinion). Reinforcing one of the principal purposes
for the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, the Court defined "reasonable
probability" as "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id.
38. 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
39. See id. at 390. In 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act (AEDPA), which modified 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000). Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 104 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). Importantly, the
AEDPA imposed the requirement that federal courts accept decisions of state post-conviction courts
that had been adjudicated on the merits unless those decisions either contradicted existing federal
law or involved an "unreasonable application" of that law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1).
40. Pub. L. No 104-132 § 104 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1)).
41. Williams, 529 U.S. at 402-03; see also Wayne M. Helge, Note, Know Your Client: The
Mundane Case of Wiggins v. Smith, 10 RoGER WniAMs U. L. REv. 581, 590 (2005).
42. Williams, 529 U.S. at 399. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas
joined Justice O'Connor's opinion regarding AEDPA's additional barrier to habeas relief. Id.
Justice Scalia joined the opinion except as to a footnote analyzing the legislative history of the
federal habeas corpus statute. Id.
43. Id. at 405, 407,409; see also Helge, supra note 41, at 590.
44. Williams, 529 U.S. at 367. Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer
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specific facts of defendant Williams, held that the state supreme court had
applied the wrong standard45 to the ineffective assistance of counsel
inquiry, satisfying the newly-imposed AEDPA burden,4 6 and further, that
both prongs of the Strickland test had been met. 47 The Court granted
Williams relief despite the new AEDPA barrier,48 perhaps signifying a
movement away from the strong presumption of reasonableness the Court
had afforded to counsel's actions since Strickland.49
In Wiggins v. Smith,5° the Court continued its demanding scrutiny of
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, applying the AEDPA-enhanced
Strickland standard set forth in Williams.51 Wiggins, like Strickland and
Williams, concerned an allegation of improper investigation into
mitigating evidence.5 2 Because the state post-conviction court had utilized
the correct legal standard, the Court stated that relief would only be
available if the state court's conclusion was "objectively unreasonable. 53
Prior to assessing the reasonableness of the state court's decision,
however, the Court focused first on the reasonableness of Wiggins' trial
counsel's decision not to offer background information during Wiggins'
mitigation case. 4 Given state and professional guidelines, as well as the
promising leads uncovered by the cursory mitigation investigation, the
Court found that Wiggins' trial counsel had not met the Strickland
standard for effective performance.55 Going further, the Wiggins Court
found both the prejudice prong of the Strickland test and the AEDPA
burden of objective unreasonableness satisfied, and granted Wiggins'

joined Justice Stevens' opinion regarding the application of the AEDPA-enhanced Strickland
standard to Williams' specific facts. Id.
45. Id. at 391. The Virginia Supreme Court misread another United States Supreme Court
decision, Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993), as "modif[ying] or in some way supplant[ing]
the rule set down in Strickland." Williams, 529 U.S. at 391. The Virginia Supreme Court measured
Williams' ineffective assistance of counsel claim not by the Strickland standard, but required, in
addition, a "separate inquiry into fundamental fairness." Id. at 393.
46. Williams, 529 U.S. at 399-400.
47. Id. at 395-97.
48. Id. at 399.
49. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,690 (1984); Wendy N. Davis, Inching Away
from Death?Ineffective-Assistance Rulings Show High Court Wary ofLawyering in CapitalCases,
A.B.A. J., Sept. 2005, at 14-16. The Court in Williams granted relief based upon a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel for the first time since Stricklandwas decided in 1984. See Helge,
supra note 41, at 591.
50. 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
51. Id. at 520-22.
52. Id. at 521.
53. See id. at 521-22 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409 (2000)); Helge, supra
note 41, at 600.
54. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 523.
55. Id. at 533-35.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss2/6

6

Hardy: Criminal Procedure: Finding the Needle—Toward a More Stringent St
CASE COMMENT

56

requested relief.
The instant case solidified the Court's progression away from the
"heavy measure of deference [applied] to counsel's judgments"57 and
toward a more stringent evaluation of counsel's performance during
capital sentencing.58 Applying the AEDPA-enhanced Strickland standard
adopted in Williams and reaffirmed in Wiggins, the instant Court granted
Petitioner's request for post-conviction relief based on trial counsel's
inadequate preparation of a mitigation case for Petitioner's penalty phase.5 9
Specifically, the Court found that because Petitioner's trial counsel
neglected to obtain and examine evidence counsel knew the prosecution
would rely upon during its aggravation case, 6° in the process failing to
discover powerful mitigation evidence contained in the same case file,
counsel's performance fell below the Strickland standard.61 Indeed, the
instant Court considered counsel's inadequacy to be so apparent that the
state court's conclusion to the contrary was objectively unreasonable.62
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Kennedy asserted that it was the
majority's distortion of the Strickland standard, and not the state postconviction court's finding, that was unreasonable.63 Justice Kennedy
contended that the instant Court had departed from the Strickland Court's
purposeful selection of a flexible standard, replacing the well-settled
totality of circumstances approach with a "new per se rule." 6 Justice
O'Connor, concurring with the majority, disagreed and stated that the
instant Court had merely applied the "longstanding case-by-case
approach ' 65 developed in Stricklandto determine that the performance of
Petitioner's counsel "was not 'reasonable considering all the
circumstances.'""
The instant Court emphasized that although the analysis into ineffective

56. Id. at 534, 536.
57. Id. at 522 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984)).
58. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The End of an Era, 8 GREEN BAG 2d 345,347,348 (2005)
(stating that the Court is "concerned about inadequate representation in capital cases"); Jeffrey L.
Fisher, No ClearIdeologies, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 3, 2005, at 14.
59. Rompilla v. Beard, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 2469 (2005).
60. Id. at 2464, 2467. The prosecution put trial counsel on notice long before the penalty
phase that it intended to use testimony from Petitioner's previous victim to establish Petitioner's
propensity to commit violent felonies. Id. at 2464. Specifically, the prosecution planned to, and in
fact did, read to the sentencing jury the previous trial testimony of a victim who Petitioner was
convicted of brutally raping, rather than simply entering the list of prior convictions into evidence.
Id.
61. Id. at 2467-68.
62. Id. at 2467.
63. Id. at 2471 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 2469 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
2469-70
(quotingRepository,
Strickland v.2006
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)).
Published66.
by Id.
UF atLaw
Scholarship
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assistance of counsel claims was still to be conducted on a case-by-case
basis and that its decision did not create a "rigid, per se" rule,67 it
continued to look to certain professional standards68 as "'guides to
determining what is reasonable.' ' 69 Nevertheless, despite its reference to
advisory checklists, the instant Court again declined to establish specific
minimum requirements.7" The instant Court feared that faced with a
categorical standard, counsel would be forced to "scour the globe" in
search of a mitigation case,71 or to "look[] for a needle in a haystack,
when... [counsel] truly has reason to doubt there is any needle there. 72
This, in the opinion of the instant Court, was beyond necessary.73
Petitioner's case, however, did not fit this description according to the
instant Court: Far from forcing counsel to sift through endless documents
with little hope of finding useful information, the prosecution had given
clear notice of its intent to use a specific, easily accessible file.74
Ultimately, by heavily quoting professional ethics manuals, such as the
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, in deciding Petitioner's ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, 75 the instant Court appeared to be validating
the use of checklists and guidebooks to a greater degree than what a true
"case-by-case approach ' 76 would allow.77 While claiming to adhere to the
flexible Strickland standard, the instant Court created a seemingly
unreachable burden for defense counsel. 78 The instant decision implied that
counsel retains some discretion to curtail, justifiably, mitigation
investigations based on indications that further searching will be fruitless.
The instant Court further suggested, however, that failing to consider
discoverable prosecution evidence when that evidence is a "sure bet" to
include information helpful to rebut an aggravation case---even if the
evidence is not necessarily guaranteed to strengthen mitigation-will be
deemed constitutionally-deficient performance.80 In truth, the result of
these implications is an opinion that comes extremely close to installing

67. Id. at 2467 (majority opinion).
68. Id. at 2466 (referring specifically to "ABA Guidelines relating to death penalty defense").
69. Id. (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003)).
70. See id.
71. Id. at2463.
72. Id.at 2467.
73. See id.
74. Id. at 2463-64.
75. Id. at 2465-66.
76. Id. at 2469-70 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
77. See id. at 2471 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
78. See id. at 2475.
79. See id. at 2463 (majority opinion).
80. See id. at 2467.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss2/6
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a bright-line minimum."'
This new, more stringent burden portends a particularly harsh future for
capital defendants relying on government-appointed counsel already
disadvantaged by severely limited financial and investigatory resources.8 2
If defense counsel must now obtain and review every document that the
prosecution has given notice it will utilize, there is a strong likelihood that
more important aspects of advocacy will be shelved.8 3 Indeed, appointed
counsel, in an effort to avoid a constitutional challenge, may "divert
resources from other tasks[,]" thereby "diminish[ing] the quality of
representation" provided to indigent capital defendants.'
Even if the instant decision expressly adheres to the Stricklandstandard
in theory, in practice it will cause confusion as counsel attempts to
decipher exactly what is required for adequate performance. 5 Caught
between the Court's professed adherence to a totality of circumstances
analysis, in which all counsel's actions will be examined, and its
constructive adoption of mandatory duties, in which counsel must secure
certain prosecution evidence to be constitutionally competent, defense
attorneys will be unable to predict what choices will insulate them from
ineffective assistance claims.86 In the end, this uncertainty will result in an
increased burden on the judicial system, as capital defendants flood the
courts with challenges-hoping that their attorneys have chosen
incorrectly. 7
The instant decision may be alternatively explainable by reference to
the Court's recent caution in death penalty matters. 8 Though the instant

81. See id. at 2475-76 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
82. See id. at 2475. This possibility is especially problematic considering that the portion of
"state felony cases in which defendants were given appointed counsel" was approximately eighty
percent in 1992. See KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 28, at 79, n.G.
83. Rompilla, 125 S. Ct. at 2475 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
84. Id.
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See id. Defense attorneys exercising their best judgments regarding what steps constitute
"effective advocacy" may
leave[] open the possibility that a defendant will seek to overturn his conviction
based on something in a prior conviction case file that went unreviewed. This
elevation of needle-in-a-haystack claims to the status of constitutional violations
will benefit undeserving defendants and saddle States with the considerable costs
of retrial and/or resentencing.
Id.
88. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 58, at 347-48 (stating that the Court is "concerned
about inadequate representation in capital cases"); Davis, supra note 49, at 14-16 (noting that the
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Court frames its conclusion as the result of a normal Strickland analysis
in which Petitioner's trial counsel simply failed to perform as a reasonable
attorney should, the decision might more reasonably "reflect the [C]ourt's
growing unease with the day-to-day administration of the death penalty in
light of the mounting proof that innocent people sometimes are convicted
of extremely serious crimes. 8 9 Indeed, Petitioner is the third capital
defendant in five years to gain post-conviction relief based upon a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel, 9' and in the same term as the instant
decision, the Court completely abolished the death penalty for juvenile
defendants. 91
The instant Court, in reaching this decision, distorted Strickland,
misapplied Williams, and disregarded Wiggins.92 Viewed narrowly, the
instant case merely extends a line of Supreme Court cases imposing harsher
scrutiny of attorney performance in capital cases. 93 Taken more broadly,
however, the instant Court may have inadvertently established the exact
categorical imperative that it sought to avoid in Strickland.94 If this broader
view is correct, the instant Court dangerously approaches interfering with the
constitutionally guarded right to autonomous, independent counsel that has
been so vigorously defended in prior decisions. 95
Court may be following a larger cultural trend of backing away from the death penalty); Fisher,
supra note 58, at 14 (noting that the Court is uneasy with the death penalty due to evidence that
some innocent people are found guilty). The Court's caution regarding capital punishment and its
trappings is not new. As early as the 1970s, some members of the Court were expressing concern
that "'[t]o identify before the fact those characteristics of criminal homicides and their perpetrators
which call for the death penalty, and to express these characteristics in language which can be fairly
understood and applied by the sentencing authority, appear to be tasks which are beyond present
human ability."' Robert F. Schopp, Reconciling "Irreconcilable"CapitalPunishmentDoctrine as
ComparativeandNoncomparativeJustice,53 FLA. L. REV. 475,521 (2001) (quoting Justice Harlan
in McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 204 (1971)).
89. Fisher, supra note 58, at 14. Apparently, the members of the Court are not alone in their
apprehension of the death penalty. Recent surveys show that the general public, when asked to
choose between the death penalty and a sentence of life in prison without parole, "preferred [the
life imprisonment] alternative to capital punishment, often by sizable majorities ...." David
McCord, Imagininga RetributivistAlternativeto CapitalPunishment,50 FLA. L. REV. 1, 10 (1998).
90. See Wiggins vSmith, 539 U.S. 510, 519 (2003); Willianis v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 399
(2000). This statistic is all the more jarring considering that sixteen years passed between the
Court's decisions in Stricklandand Williams to reverse the imposition of the death penalty due to
ineffective assistance.
91. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 1200 (2005).
dissenting).
92. See Rompilla, 125 S.Ct. at 2475-76 (Kennedy, J.,
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95. See id. at 2473.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss2/6
10

